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Welfare Analysis of Offshore Wind by Julian Silk:               
A Comment
By Richard Green*
In the IAEE Energy Forum for the 2nd Quarter of 2012, Julian Silk offered an analysis of the welfare 
economics of offshore wind power, motivated by Maryland’s proposed scheme and inspired by the tools 
used to analyse the impact of an import quota on a domestic market.  Unfortunately, those tools do not 
easily transfer from the trade-relevant case of a maximum supply from a cheap source to the energy case 
of a minimum supply from an expensive one.  In the case of trade, once the quota of cheap imports is 
used up, all other demand must be met from domestic sources, and the price must rise to their marginal 
cost (if that market is otherwise competitive).  This price is also received by importers, despite their 
lower costs.  
The governor of Maryland is currently proposing to source 20% of its electricity from renewable 
sources, and Dr. Silk argues that the marginal cost of these sources will set the price for all the power 
sold in the state. “The price going to the wind suppliers will be [the cost of offshore wind]. If the price 
is higher, more wind supply will come into the market to drive it down. If it is lower, wind suppliers 
will exit the market … the last, marginal, fossil supplier has a supply price equal to [the cost of offshore 
wind]. If this fossil supply price is higher, more wind will be purchased, and the price will be driven back 
down. If it is lower, the electricity market will attempt to purchase more fossil energy, and come upon the 
binding quota restriction, which will drive the price back up.”  This is represented by a leftwards shift of 
their supply curve, and Dr. Silk comments that “[the area between the old and new supply curves] can 
be considered to be costs for fossil fuel producers.”  Is the effect on prices the equivalent to the standard 
analysis of an import quota, in which the ability to sell at a price raised by the quota leads to higher profits 
for the importing firms?  I will argue that neither wholesale nor retail prices will be affected in the way 
that Dr. Silk suggests.  Furthermore, I cannot conceive of a way in which, as in Dr Silk’s world, the pres-
ence of a quota of high-cost generators somehow raises the costs of every other generator on the system.
To analyse the price impacts, we need to know how the renewable generators will be supported – in 
Maryland, this is to be through Offshore Renewable Energy Certificates (ORECs).  The owner of an 
offshore wind farm is entitled to sell one OREC (at an administered price) for each MWh it generates, 
giving up all the energy market (and other) revenues it receives in return.  The ORECs are then bought 
by electricity retailers, in proportion to their sales, and the cost is offset by redistributing the wind farm’s 
energy revenues to the OREC holders.  The net cost is thus the difference between the OREC price and 
the market price for the station’s output.  A retailer that does not hold enough ORECs pays an (adminis-
tratively set) penalty.
Dr. Silk discusses these certificates and suggests that 
“it would be reasonable for generators to purchase the [O]
REC, and immediately sell 1 MWH of their own genera-
tion.”  This somehow leads him to conclude that the fossil 
generators would now have a higher marginal cost than the 
wind farms and would, therefore, require a subsidy if they 
were to continue to operate.
I am not quite sure how fossil-fuel generators could 
purchase an OREC and immediately sell their own power, 
since the OREC is only given for output actually deliv-
ered.  But rather than struggle further with Dr. Silk’s ar-
ticle, I thought it might be helpful to present some analysis 
that reflects the way in which electricity markets actually 
operate.  In the short run, the output from wind farms can 
be taken as completely inelastic – absent transmission or 
other constraints, the entire available output will be sold, 
given its zero marginal cost.  Once wind farms have been added to an electricity system, we, therefore, 
need to shift the supply curve of the fossil-fuelled stations to the right, by the 
amount of wind production.  This can reduce wholesale market prices in the 
short run, as observed in Germany (Sensfuß et al, 2008) and in Spain (Sáenz 
de Miera et al, 2008).  Figure 1 shows a short-run market equilibrium with the 
supply curve shifted in this way.  The fossil stations produce the difference be-
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Figure 1: A market with a wind quota: short-run equilibrium
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Response to Professor Green’s Comment
I thank Professor Green for his comment on my analysis.  My impression, in working through the 
comment, is that we are making different assumptions.  That the short-run supply of wind is absolutely 
inelastic with respect to price is certainly a different assumption than I was making.  That the wind sup-
pliers will enter the market regardless of their receipts is different as well.  If the wind suppliers lower 
the wholesale prices over what they would otherwise be, as in the examples of Spain and Germany that 
are cited, well and good, but I wonder if there are not some other costs that are being disguised or not 
counted.
My understanding, which I will be delighted to correct if it is mistaken, is that the wind producers 
must receive payment to cover their all fixed costs and marginal costs each year, or they will not enter the 
system at all.  Yes, the marginal costs are zero for wind.  But the fixed costs in annualized terms are not. 
In looking at Figure 1, the wind producers just get what they get.  But implicitly, it would seem that the 
marginal cost for the wind producers is as in Figure 2, much higher than the market equilibrium price.  If 
this is the case, and the price is only p
fossil
, how do we know that p
fossil
 + orec covers the payment for the 
fixed costs of the wind suppliers?  Either the wind suppliers are given a long-term guarantee that their 
costs will be covered later, which has market value now, or the fossil fuel generators pay for it, or the 
consumers pay for it.  If the wind suppliers were willing to accept less, why would Delaware’s offshore 
wind farm, so similar (almost in swimming distance) to the one proposed for Maryland, be facing the 
financing difficulties detailed in “Offshore wind ‘backbone’ still a plus for Delaware”, online at http://
www.delawareonline.com/article/20120517/BUSINESS09/305170027/Offshore-wind-backbone-still-
plus-Delaware? Professor Green accepts a discontinuity at the intersection between supply and demand 
in Figure 1; I am much more skeptical.  My renewable energy certificates are much more expensive than 
Professor Green’s, it seems.
Something similar seems to apply for Figure 2.  The wind producers are receiving a much higher 
payment for the power they produce than are the fossil fuel producers.  The wind producers are mak-
ing an economic profit of zero, yes.  But the fossil fuel producers are paying Area C plus the lower two 
rectangles, as Professor Green rightly notes.  Why should they do this in the long run?  It was always 
an implicit assumption in my argument that there was an electricity market as an alternative to PJM to 
which electricity generators could turn if PJM did not provide at least as much profits as the alternate 
market.  As the fossil fuel producers close up shop, retire plants, or more likely, never build them at all, 
LRMC
fossil 
moves up.  If it moves up until it meets LRMC
wind
, then these payments stop, and that’s what 
I think will be the equilibrium result.
Actual wind production is plagued by the need for spinning reserve, periods of negative pricing and 
loop flow, in addition to the constant high annualized cost.  I have tried to go into this in my “Wind 
Problems” submission for the IAEE Blog.  To cite from there, “There have been various attempts to use 
batteries as spinning reserve. The latest and most efficient of these is being conducted in Chile (see http://
generationhub.com/2012/05/03/aes-combines-advanced-battery-based-energy-storage).”  If batteries (as 
in Chile), can be used as backup for wind, then perhaps we can have an empirical test to see who is right.
Trying to seriously discuss wind on a large scale for the U.S. has an air of unreality now, in the wake 
of the success of Governor Scott Walker (R-Wisconsin) in the recall election called to replace him.  This 
bodes very well for the success of Governor Mitt Romney, who has made renewable energy a favorite 
target, in the November U.S. Presidential election.  My object is not to generically oppose wind or any 
renewable energy, far from it.  It is to make absolutely sure it delivers on its promises, especially for cost, 
without special pleading, so as to escape the backlash that is threatening it, and become a significant part 
of the world’s energy supply.
Julian Silk
